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“Quite possibly there's nothing as fine as a big freight train starting across country in 
early summer... That's when you learn that the tragedy of plants is that they have roots.” 
– Mark Helprin, Winter’s Tale (1983) 
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Abstract 
This study presents multiple approaches to examine the liberalization of rail transport in 
the European Union. A legislative review highlights the importance of unbundling 
infrastructure management and service operations in railway reforms. Furthermore, 
simultaneous and sequential decision making models specify how market opening 
minimizes the social deadweight loss and lead to more competitive pricing. Two 
production frontier models also analyze the effects of vertical disintegration and market 
opening on network outputs. Results suggest that both vertical unbundling and increasing 
competitiveness help improve productivity. Lastly, three case studies compare policy 
implementations across Europe. The United Kingdom, a front runner in railway 
liberalization, has used franchising to split up British Rail extensively. Germany’s 
integrated model, which keeps the infrastructure manager and the service operator under 
one umbrella company, has also reached the advanced level. Still, the incumbent 
Deutsche Bahn has maintained its dominance in long-distance routes. Meanwhile in 
France, reluctance to replace public ownership in railway companies poses a substantial 
obstacle for market opening reforms.  
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Part I: Introduction 
In the 1980s, as railway companies lost ridership and became increasingly dependent on 
public funding, governments across Europe were under pressure to reform the heavily 
subsidized national railway networks (Andersson & Hultén, 2009; Szekely, 2009). Rail 
transport liberalization first took place in Sweden in 1988, when the Transport Policy Act 
was adopted. Following this legislation, the Swedish government formed Banvekert, the 
national infrastructure manager, while the incumbent monopoly SJ AB became a service 
operator, paying infrastructure usage fees to Banvekert (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2008). 
Moreover, local transport authorities took over SJ AB’s ownership of regional routes and 
were able to offer competitive tendering in these routes. This reform resulted in the first 
market entrance in 1990, a lower level of public subsidies and a price reduction in the 
operations of regional lines (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2008; International Labor 
Organization, 1991). The successful vertical separation between infrastructure 
management and service operations in Sweden and progresses in increasing competition 
in several other member states provided the regulatory framework for a EU-wide reform 
that was aimed to liberalize national railway networks in Europe as they became more 
integrated (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2008).  
Since its initiation in Directive 91/440, the liberalization process of rail transport has been 
central to European Union competition policy. The European Commission (2008) argued 
that opening up rail transport market and privatizing existing monopolies helped promote 
rail networks’ efficiency and responsiveness to customers’ demand. Alexandersson and 
Hultén (2008), however, highlighted that privatizing public monopolies like railways was 
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mainly aimed to gain revenues for the public sector or to reduce public subsidies in the 
future. Like in Sweden’s 1988 reform, the foremost step of EU railway liberalization 
involved vertical separation between infrastructure management and service operations. 
Implementing Directive 91/440, the European Commission emphasized establishing 
distinct organization entities to differentiate rail transport operators and infrastructure 
managers, and required separate accounting systems between these two network levels. 
Lawmakers considered this separation a vital boost for market competition by providing 
equal rail capacity allocation, fair infrastructure charging and easy licensing for new rail 
operators (European Commission, 2008). Directive 91/440 was later followed by three 
main reform packages and several legislations to deregulate rail markets in multiple 
aspects. A regulatory review in the next chapter will analyze EU rail liberalization 
reforms in detail. 
My thesis will furthermore provide a theoretical framework to examine rail transport 
liberalization. Analyses based on antitrust economics and game theory principles were 
developed to answer several questions such as: Why is a monopolistic market inefficient? 
How do new entrants improve market conditions? How are market outcomes affected 
after the market opening? How do the players determine their prices and market shares? 
An econometric analysis of railway reforms will also be featured as my thesis’s second 
main focus. Using a production frontier model based on the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, two regression tests will examine European rail networks’ productivity under 
the impact of increasing market competitiveness and unbundling infrastructure 
management and service operations. The two tests cover different time frames and 
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geographical span and are expected to provide alternating perspectives of rail 
liberalization outcomes. 
The reality of rail reform implementation also varies widely between networks across 
Europe. The operational structures range from complete separation in the United 
Kingdom, partial separation in Germany and less separation in France. The outcomes of 
deregulation are also significantly different between EU member states. The last chapter 
of this thesis, thus, will compare the reality of railway liberalization in different national 
networks. 
 
  
4 
Part II: Legislative Review 
In a 2004 study on competition policy in the European Union, Knieps introduced a 
disaggregated analysis of network sectors to locate the appropriate focus of antitrust 
regulation. Knieps’ findings highlighted that network sectors such as electricity, water 
supply, air transport and rail transport contained three fundamental levels: network 
infrastructure, infrastructure management and network services. In rail transport, the base 
level corresponds to the construction of tracks and other fixed infrastructure, while the 
intermediate level deals with traffic and infrastructure administration and the top level is 
rail service operations. The three layers in network sectors can be summarized as follows: 
• Base level: Network infrastructure = construction of tracks and other fixed 
infrastructure  
• Intermediate level: Infrastructure management = railway traffic control and track 
management 
• Top level: Network services = rail transport services 
In a monopolistic national railway network, all of the three levels are usually controlled 
by one large-scale corporation that builds tracks and stations, controls rail traffic and runs 
train services. It should also be noted that entry to the fixed infrastructure level can incur 
an enormous sunk cost for building tracks, which makes it highly difficult, or even 
impossible to boost competition. This barrier to entry at the base level is usually referred 
to as a monopolistic bottleneck: the track owner is the sole upstream supplier of 
infrastructure access to train service operators. When the track owner also runs train 
services, they would obviously give prioritized infrastructure access to their own 
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operations. As a result, unbundling this vertical tie between track management and train 
services is a vital move to increase market competition in network sectors.  
The EU Directive 91/440 was the European Union Council’s foremost step in its ongoing 
process of liberalizing the member states’ railway markets. This legislation focused on 
breaking down rail networks’ vertical integration by establishing distinct organization 
entities for train service operations and infrastructure management. With this approach, 
antitrust lawmakers aimed at boosting market competition by ensuring that “essential 
functions such as allocation of rail capacity (the ‘train paths’ that companies need to be 
able to operate trains on the network), infrastructure charging and licensing must be 
separated from the operation of transport services and performed in a neutral fashion to 
give new rail operators fair access to the market” (European Commission, 2008, p. 8). 
After most member states unbundled their track managers and service operators at the 
accounting level, the railway liberalization process continued with two next key 
regulations in 1995 that focused on licensing and infrastructure allocation. Directive 
95/18/EC specified a universal licensing process for new railway undertakings; thanks to 
this crucial legislative move, a train service operator who successfully obtained a license 
from one EU member state could freely compete in all other EU markets. On the other 
hand, Directive 95/19/EC provided the framework for fair allocation and infrastructure 
capacity charging for railway undertakings. Based on the focus of these two legislations, 
it could be seen that the initial Directive 91/440, which separated the vertical integration 
between infrastructure management and service operations, would become largely 
ineffective without these subsequent reforms. 
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Coming into effect in 2001, the First Railway Package provided improvement and 
development from the initial legislations in 1991 and 1995. First of all, Directive 
2001/12/EC extended the original Directive 91/440 that focused on breaking down the 
vertical tie by establishing clearer requirements for the relationship between the state and 
the infrastructure manager, and between the infrastructure manager and service operators. 
Besides, Directive 2001/13/EC introduced additional licensing requirements introduced 
in Directive 95/18/EC by bringing in more safety and service quality criteria. Directive 
2001/14/EC furthermore focused on advancing the framework for non-discriminatory 
allocation and charging of infrastructure in Directive 95/19/EC: it required infrastructure 
access fees to be set and collected by an independent entity and thus eliminated the 
potential to manipulate the monopolistic power of infrastructure managers (European 
Commission, 2010). In addition, according to this European Commission comprehensive 
study, the First Railway Package also boosted Trans-European rail transport by 
minimizing delays at borders and setting up a relevant inter-network tariff structure. 
The Second Railway Package adopted in 2004 was the European Union Council’s next 
step to liberalize the national and international rail transport networks with a focus on 
upgrading safety and interoperability. Directive 2004/49/EC targeted greater 
harmonization of safety requirements for new railway undertakings across member states, 
which in turn, provided European railway companies with greater opportunities to 
operate internationally, as well as to enter new markets. Interoperability was further 
enhanced in Directive 2004/50/EC, which developed common requirements for 
international high speed train services. Moreover, Regulation (EC) 881/2004 founded the 
European Railway Agency to administrate the common safety principles and boost EU-
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wide integration of member states’ rail networks. On the other hand, Directive 
2004/51/EC also opened up the domestic and international cargo markets – an essential 
step that brought the liberalization process to the next level with a free freight transport 
market. 
In 2007, the European Commission implemented the Third Railway Package that further 
improved the liberalization process established in the previous legislative approaches. 
Directive 2007/58/EC allowed free access to the international market of passenger 
transport, which could be seen as another vital boost in the opening of railway markets. 
Furthermore, passengers’ basic rights were ensured and enhanced at a EU-wide level in 
Regulation (EC) 1371/2007. Besides, the Third Railway Package also helped increase the 
interoperability of the Trans-European railway network by developing common licensing 
for train drivers: license holders could now move much more easily among different EU 
member states’ national networks. 
As of January 2013, the European Commission had finished constructing the draft for the 
Fourth Railway Package (Barrow, 2013); AK Europa reported in March 2013 that the 
European Parliament was currently debating to improve the proposals. The package 
would finally open up domestic passenger transport networks, which provided external 
service operators with full access to infrastructure in all national and regional markets 
(Barrow, 2013).  Liberalizing domestic passenger transport could be considered as one of 
the final major steps that would maximize the degree of market opening in EU railway 
legislation. Following this legislation, both domestic and international networks of freight 
and passenger transport would be fully opened for competition. The International 
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Railway Journal also suggested transferring rolling stock authorization to the European 
Railway Agency as an important approach that would reduce the market entry cost and 
time for new players by twenty percent and save the EU railway industry 500 million 
euros by 2025 (Barrow, 2013). 
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Part III: Theoretical Framework 
Reasoning based on market competition principles can justify whether opening up rail 
transport networks across Europe is a worthy process. As such, the following chapter will 
present theoretical analyses of how eliminating monopoly power and boosting 
competition make railway markets more efficient and socially desirable. 
1. Monopoly 
Suppose that a national railway network has a monopoly on a freight transport route and 
that output equals the amount of goods carried in tons while price is the dollar amount 
charged for each ton. When the incumbent monopoly firm wants to increase the number 
of goods transported, it must reduce the price charged for its cargo service to appeal to 
more customers, which leads to a price decrease in every ton it carries. As this would lead 
to a decrease of total revenue in the existing amount of goods it was already receiving, 
assuming that demand is inelastic, the monopoly would have no incentive to do so. As a 
result, the marginal revenue of a monopoly is less than the price and the marginal revenue 
curve lies below the demand curve (Figure 1). Just like any neoclassical firm, the 
monopoly will choose the output level where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal 
cost (MC), so the amount of goods the railway company carries is QM and the price it 
charges is PM.  
In contrast, if the freight transport market were perfectly competitive, the firm would still 
choose an output level where MR equals MC, but the price it would charge, PC, results in 
a larger total quantity of goods transported, QC, than under monopoly, QM. This socially 
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efficient price-quantity combination is reached as the firm’s marginal revenue curve is 
identical to the firm’s demand curve in a perfectly competitive market. Moreover, the 
efficient equilibrium (QM, PM) incurs no deadweight loss, a market condition that is 
considered efficient and socially desirable. 
 
Price 
        A                  MC       
           MC     Deadweight loss   
     PM                 Producer surplus 
              Consumer surplus 
     PC       B               under monopoly 
 
      Demand 
         MR 
 
 
 
 
   QM QC    Quantity 
 
Figure 1: Market conditions under monopoly and competition 
In a perfectly competitive market, consumer surplus is the area of triangle ABPC in 
Figure 1. Under monopoly, the consumer surplus is shrunk to the gridded triangle area, 
while the monopoly’s profit (or producer surplus) is represented by the dotted rectangle 
above line BPC, which is the difference between monopolistic price and competitive 
price, times the number of goods transported. The area of the vertically dashed triangle is 
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called the deadweight loss, which indicates a social cost of economic inefficiency. As a 
result of this, the government seeks to limit and regulate markets with monopoly power 
to maximize efficiency and to reduce the social cost from deadweight loss.  
 
2. Price competition 
After the liberalization reforms, each rail transport market in Europe can be referred to as 
an oligopoly, as there are now a small number of service providers. Popular oligopoly 
analyses include the Cournot model – a quantity approach, and the Bertrand model – a 
price approach (Judd, 1996). The Cournot model assumes that oligopolists set output and 
the market price will adjust to match quantity. On the other hand, in the Betrand model, 
oligopolists determine the price determinants and consumers choose output levels 
contingent on the set market price. A 1999 study by Preston, Wheland and Wardman 
highlighted that demand in transport markets, including rail transport, was inelastic, as 
there is a set number of riders and a set number of goods carried in every route. When a 
specific railway market has a new entrant, demand will not rise drastically and both the 
incumbent and the newcomer have to determine their price strategy to meet the existing 
demand. Given this nature of the railway industry, we can conclude that the Bertrand 
model is more appropriate for the analysis of rail transport oligopolies. 
Assume the following Bertrand game in a passenger rail route with 2 players: Firm A, the 
incumbent and Firm B, the entrant. In order to find the best price strategy, newcomer 
Firm B must consider both its own price and the existing monopoly Firm A’s price to 
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determine the demand for its rail transport service. Furthermore, assume that services 
offered by both firms are identical and that train riders’ choice is a function of price. 
Initially, riders have no time preference of train services (time slot allocation will be 
discussed further in the next section). If the newcomer Firm B sets its price higher than 
that of the incumbent, no one will buy Firm B’s tickets. On the other hand, if Firm B sets 
its price lower than Firm A’s price, no one will buy Firm A’s tickets. If Firm B selects a 
price equal to the incumbent’s price, both firms will have an equal number of riders. The 
discontinuous demand function for Firm B’s output can be expressed as follows: 
 qB = 0    if pB > pA 
 qB = (a – bp2)/2 if pB = pA 
 qB = a – bp2   if pB < pA 
 (From the Bertrand demand function: P = A – BQ, the demand function is rewritten as: 
Q = a – bP where a = A/B and b = 1/B.) 
From this function, we can determine Firm B’s profit, as a function of pA and pB: 
 πB (pA,pB) = 0     if pB > pA 
 πB (pA,pB) = (pB – c)(a – bpB)/2 if pB = pA 
πB (pA,pB) = (pB – c)(a – bpB)  if pB < pA 
where c is the cost of producing one unit, in this case, the cost of providing train service 
for one ticket. 
We now seek the price pB that maximizes Firm B’s profit in response to different choices 
of pA.  If Firm A sets its fare above the pure monopoly price, Firm B’s best response is to 
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set its fare at the monopoly price and earn the monopoly profit. If Firm A sets a price 
under its marginal cost c (which means Firm A will lose money by operating its train 
service), Firm B’s best response is to set a higher price. In this case, Firm B has no riders 
and sells no tickets. However, if Firm B sets its price lower than pA, and hence, lower 
than its marginal cost c, it will gain negative profit. The most likely case, however, is 
when the incumbent sets its price above the marginal cost but below or equal to the 
monopoly price. If Firm B sets its fare equal to that of Firm A’s fare, both firms will 
share an equal number of riders. However, if Firm B sets its fare slightly lower than Firm 
A’s fare, it will cover the whole market while its profit margin per ticket is only lowered 
by a very small amount.  
We also expect a similar response from Firm A in response to any given choice of pB, as 
this game is symmetric. Suppose that when Firm B enters the market, it sets its fare 
slightly below Firm A’s fare. Then, Firm B will cover the entire market and Firm A will 
have no riders. However, Firm A’s managers know that if it lowers its price slightly 
below Firm B’s price, it will cover the entire market again and leave Firm B with no 
riders. Simply put, in this game, both firms know that their best response is to set the 
price slightly lower than the rival’s price. As a result, the only possible Nash equilibrium 
is the equal price settings at the marginal cost (pA = c, pB = c). At this level, neither of the 
firms wants to lower its fare further as negative profit will occur. Interestingly, the price 
set equal at the marginal cost is also the same under perfect competition. This outcome 
exemplifies the Bertrand Paradox, since there are only 2 firms with monopoly power 
selling an identical product, but these firms are mimicking a perfectly competitive result. 
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This certainly is an important result that highlights the ability of market opening reforms 
to boost price competition and eliminate market power of incumbent railway monopolies. 
The Bertrand analysis above is carried out under the assumption that both firms are equal 
players in this oligopolistic passenger rail market and that riders have no preference of 
one service over the other. However, in reality, the incumbent certainly has dominant 
market power, given its established ridership and a more extensive network that makes it 
easier for connections. As a result, the newcomer has to consider various methods to 
avoid competing directly with the existing monopoly. The following section will discuss 
in detail the decision making process that the entrant goes through. 
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3. Game theory models 
Ruiz-Rúa and Palacín (2012) summarized the decision making process of a new railway 
undertaking in the following diagram: 
 
 
   company decides not 
   to enter into competition 
 
             NO 
 
       first stage    YES 
access decision phase 
 
 
    
  
    investment requirement and needs 
 
Figure 2: “Competition Strategic Plan” (Ruiz-Rúa & Palacín, 2012) 
According to this strategy model, in the first stage, the newcomer decides whether or not 
they should enter into competition, using available information pertaining existing 
ridership, profit margins and regulations. In the next stage, the newcomer becomes a 
market player and assesses operation strategies such as how much they should charge and 
the market share they should cover. Price decisions are also crucial to the profitability of 
service operations, as discussed in the Bertrand analysis. After evaluating their profits 
based on the price and market share strategies, the new entrant will determine the 
 
second stage 
company strategic 
assessment phase 
 
equilibrium prices 
 
 
market share 
 
 
 
 
market calculation 
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investment requirements and come back to the first decision phase of whether they 
should stay in the market. 
Two of the most important market strategies that new railway undertakings have to 
determine are time slot allocation and price determination. Scheduling strategies allow 
the new player to avoid direct competition with the incumbent and cover the empty time 
slots with higher growth potential. On the other hand, price setting decisions can 
significantly affect the newcomer’s gain in ridership, which determines their ability to 
stay in the market. The following analysis will provide a deeper insight into these two 
game theoretical strategies. 
 
a. Time slot allocation 
Consider the following game based on Pepall and Richards and Norman’s hypothetical 
example for air transport competition (2005). Suppose that a popular passenger train 
route between two cities is currently run by Firm A, the national rail monopoly. After the 
market opening reforms that allow fair access for all players to railway infrastructure 
have been implemented, the newly-formed regional rail company Firm B is interested in 
operating train services in the same route. Moreover, suppose that 60 percent of 
customers prefer to take a morning train while only 40 percent prefer the evening 
schedule. Also, assume that the incumbent is preferred over Firm B at a ratio of 3:1. 
Reasons for this preference might include the incumbent’s customer loyalty program, a 
larger network that makes it easier for connections, or riders’ status quo biases that 
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prevent them from switching to the unfamiliar service run by Firm B. The strategy 
combinations of time slot allocation and payoffs are as follows: 
 
Firm B 
Morning Evening 
Firm A 
Morning 45, 15 60, 40 
Evening 40, 60 30, 10 
Table 1: Simultaneous game for time slot allocation 
Firm A’s managers will seek their strategies in response to what they predict Firm B will 
do, or Firm B’s reaction function. If Firm B chooses to operate in the morning, Firm A 
will also choose a morning schedule, as the payoff is greater than an evening service. If 
Firm B chooses to operate in the evening, Firm A will obviously choose the morning 
schedule that riders prefer. The existing monopoly benefits from its established ridership 
and will always choose to operate in the time slot with more customers (morning).  
Therefore, Firm A’s dominant strategy is to choose the morning time slot, regardless of 
what B does. 
As for Firm B, competition would be difficult if they chose to operate at the same time 
period as the incumbent. Therefore, Firm B will choose to operate in the evening if Firm 
A runs the morning service. Likewise, if Firm A selects the evening schedule, Firm B 
will try to avoid direct competition with Firm A by running a morning service. In other 
words, when riders’ preference for one schedule over the other is not overwhelming (60% 
for morning and 40% for evening), the new entrant Firm B is likely to select a different 
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slot to avoid time conflict with the incumbent. This result is similar to the classical 
“Chicken Game” in which each player’s best response is to choose the opposite strategy.  
In short, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this hypothetical game is: Firm A runs a 
rider-preferred morning schedule while Firm B operates their service in the evening, or 
NEPS Firm A, Firm B = [Morning, Evening]. 
 
b. Price determination 
As mentioned above, Preston, Whelan and Wardman’s 1999 study highlighted that the 
rail transport demand in the United Kingdom was rather inelastic. When a new firm 
entered the market and introduced a lower fare, the incumbent monopoly was forced to 
reduce its existing fare as well. Moreover, this price reduction only brought about an 
insignificant increase in ridership. Even though the trend might vary between countries, 
the findings for the United Kingdom comply with the general tendency that transport 
demand is inelastic. In other words, there is a set number of frequent riders in most routes 
and a fare decrease does not expand ridership extensively. 
Now, imagine the following price game. After the liberalization reforms, Firm B enters 
the railway industry dominated by Firm A, which charges the monopoly profit 
maximizing fare. The price strategy for Firm B can be explained by the following 
extensive form game: 
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Firm B 
         same price        lower price 
         Firm A          Firm A                         
s     same price         lower price      same price        lower price 
       50, 50      0, 100   100, 0           50, 50 
Figure 3: Sequential game for price determination 
As the leader of this game for fare setting, newcomer Firm B has to determine how much 
they should charge per ticket given Firm A’s existing monopolistic price. As it doesn’t 
make sense if Firm B charges a higher fare while providing the same service, they will 
choose between a price level equal or lower than that of Firm A. As the follower, Firm A 
then considers whether they should keep their existing fare or reduce the price to match 
Firm B’s new low price. When both railway firms have the same fare level, each of them 
covers half of the market, assuming that riders have no preference for one firm over the 
other. When the two firms charge different fares, the one with the lower price will cover 
the whole market. It should also be noted that the inflexibility of rail transport demand, as 
explained above, allows us to assume that the number of riders stays the same even after 
a price reduction. 
Applying backward induction to find a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium specifies that 
Firm A will choose to lower its price if Firm B charges the previous monopoly price so 
that Firm A captures the entire market. On the other hand, if B sets a lower fare than A’s 
previous fare, A will also reduce its price to match this lower ticket charge. Each firm 
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now will cover half of the market. In the next step, knowing Firm A’s price strategy, 
Firm B will decide to set its fare lower than previous monopolistic level so that it will 
have half of the market share. The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this sequential 
game is: 
NESPFirm B, Firm A = [lower price, lower price] 
In fact, the fares of the two firms are not automatically equal at first. However, both firms 
continually reduce their prices until they reach an equal level at the marginal cost. As this 
is exactly what happens in a perfectly competitive market, this result complies with the 
Bertrand Paradox described in the previous section. 
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Part IV: Econometric Tests 
1. Literature review 
Studies on European railway networks’ productivity after the liberalization process have 
exhibited different approaches to evaluate network efficiency. The efficiency definition, 
which mostly referred to either input-output efficiency or cost efficiency, led to 
somewhat contradicting interpretations of rail liberalization results. Friebel, Ivaldi & 
Vibes (2010) introduced a production frontier model, which directly measured the effect 
of the (de)regulation on network output. This study utilized a simple input-output 
regression model, which included a weighted sum of outputs in passenger transport and 
freight as the dependent variable and capital and labor plus a dummy variable for the 
policy implementation as explanatory variables. The findings justified the positive impact 
of the sequential reforms in rail transport on the network output productivity. As the 
model by Friebel et al. is very appropriate to my study, its properties will be discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
Instead of using an increase in output as an efficiency indicator, other studies on 
European rail reforms have focused on operating costs to determine the impact of 
deregulation on the networks’ performance (Asmild, Holvad, Hougaard & Kronborg, 
2009; Driessen, Lijesen & Mulder, 2006; Growitsch & Wetzel, 2009). For instance, 
Asmild et al. (2009) employed this approach using a Multi-directional Efficiency 
Analysis with complete data from 23 European countries between 1995 and 2001, the 
main phase of policy implementation for vertical separation between infrastructure 
management and service operations. This Multi-directional Efficiency Analysis was 
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aimed to identify how specific cost drivers changed as a result of these reforms. Results 
also showed that the liberalization implementations generally helped increase the 
operating cost efficiency of European railway networks. More specifically, vertical 
disintegration significantly reduced both material and staff expenditures, while other 
reform packages only resulted in improving efficiency in one of the two cost types. 
Using a similar cost efficiency approach, Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) employed Data 
Envelopment Analysis to focus on the effect of vertical separation on the cost efficiency 
of railway companies. The analysis compared the vertically separated model of European 
railway companies after liberalization with a hypothesized integrated model. The results, 
which were based entirely on theoretical estimates rather than precise firm-level data, 
disregarded the reforms’ aim to boost efficiency and favored vertical integration between 
infrastructure management and service operations. 
Driessen et al. (2006) also used Data Envelopment Analysis at an international level and 
focused on measuring the relationship between competition design and rail transport 
productive efficiency. Given the worldwide variability of production models, this study 
highlighted that different methods of operating railway systems could result in different 
network efficiency levels. Competitive public tendering, which was commonly practiced 
in short distance routes in Europe, was found to significantly boost productive efficiency. 
However, this analysis also pointed out that free market entry had a negative effect on the 
networks’ cost efficiency. 
The relationship between infrastructure management and service operations, briefly 
mentioned in the production frontier model by Friebel et al., was fully analyzed by 
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Cantos Sánchez (2001) using a translogarithmic cost function analysis. Covering twelve 
European state-owned rail companies between 1973 and 1990, this mathematical study 
suggested diseconomies of scope between freight and passenger transport: freight 
transport costs were complementary to infrastructure costs while passenger transport 
costs were substitutes for infrastructure management costs.  
 
2. Econometric models 
In this section, I develop two regression models to examine the impact of vertical 
separation and market opening on network output. Test design is based on the production 
frontier model by Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes (2010). This model captured the Cobb-
Douglas production function which related output and two inputs, labor and capital. 
Friebel et al. introduced technical progress (γi + θ0Deregulation) on the input side to 
examine whether the implementation of railway reforms affected the productivity of 
national railway networks. In the first regression, Friebel et al. did not distinguish 
between the three types of reforms: vertical separation, third party access and formation 
of an independent regulatory entity. Their study later analyzed the efficiency impact of 
whether railway liberalization regulations were implemented as a package (two or three 
reforms within a year) or in sequence, and found the latter method to be more effective. 
My first study, however, focused solely on the vertical split between infrastructure 
management and operations and its impact on network output. The econometric model, 
thus, is specified as follows: 
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  ln yit = β0 + β1 ln Kit+ β2 ln Lit + β3Separationit + εit 
Capital (K) is measured by the track length of a particular country i in a specific year t. 
Labor (L) is represented by the annual number of employees in a national railway 
network. The dummy variable Separation takes the value of 0 in years prior to the 
vertical split and 1 in years following the implementation. This leads to another main 
difference between my test and the original production frontier model. Friebel et al. 
(2010) used (γi+θ0Deregulation)t, a multiplicative variable between time and railway 
liberalization to examine how the reforms shifted the slope of the productivity trend. My 
study, however, employs a simpler dummy variable Separation, as the main focus of this 
test is on how vertical disintegration has changed the level rather than the slope of the 
productivity trend.  
On the other hand, output (y) corresponds to a weighted sum of outputs in freight and 
passenger traffic, as suggested in the output measures by Friebel et al.: ln yit =ln passkmit 
+ λ ln tonkmit.  Friebel et al. (2010) used an available estimate of ! based on an empirical 
measure for the relationship between freight and passenger transport. This finding 
suggested that ! lied between 0.24 and 0.27, which indicated that a one percent increase 
in the amount of goods carried in freight transport approximately resulted in a 0.25 
percent decrease in passenger traffic (Friebel et al., 2010). 
The second linear regression also employs this production frontier model, but focuses on 
how the level of competitiveness affects network output. The econometric model is 
designed as follows: 
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  ln yit = β0 + β1 ln Kit+ β2 ln Lit + β3COMit + εit 
The new explanatory variable COM represents IBM and Kirchner’s COM Index (2011), 
which assessed the market opening level of national railway networks in Europe. The 
COM Index captured three aspects of market opening reality: modal split between track 
management and train service (20%), number of licensed and active railway companies 
other than the incumbent (20%), and market share of these newcomer competitors (60%) 
(IBM & Kirchner, 2011). Regarding the reality of vertical disintegration, the index 
focused on operational share and improvement across time of modal split in both 
passenger and rail transport. The second criterion on the number of newcomer railway 
companies took into account three measures: certified new railway undertakings in 
relation to network length, a ratio of active to certified railway undertakings and number 
of railway undertakings with regular passenger transport service. Market share of external 
railway undertakings, the most important category that contributed 60% to the total 
index, consisted of share percentage as well as share increases across time. Overall, with 
its comprehensive assessment of competitive dynamics, the COM Index is an appropriate 
measure for the reality of railway market opening in Europe. A summary of how the 2011 
index was conducted is illustrated in table A.1 of the Appendix. 
 
3. Data collection 
Information on the annual track length of all national railway networks was obtained 
from the World Bank (2012) database. The International Union of Railways database 
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(2011) provided my study with annual number of employees, number of passengers 
transported per kilometer and the amount of goods carried per kilometer. Friebel et al. 
(2010) also summarized information on years of vertical separation between 
infrastructure management and service operations. Details are illustrated in Table A.2 of 
the Appendix. My dataset comprises of twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom over a twenty-three year period from 1985 to 2008, when all railway 
reforms in the European Union took place.  
The measure for competitiveness in my second regression model is the COM Index from 
IBM and Kirchner’s 2011 study on EU rail liberalization. The data is collected from the 
DICE Database of Center for Economic Studies, University of Munich (2011). As this 
data source covered a more recent time frame, my study will include nine newer 
members of the European Union: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. As the total number of countries has now 
increased to twenty-one, the study on market opening reality is expected to provide a 
broader perspective of railway competition in the European Union of the modern day. It 
should also be noted that this index has only been published four times in 2002, 2004, 
2007 and 2011. The data for other input and output variables will thus be collected for 
only the year prior to each publication. In other words, compared to the first study on 
vertical split, the dataset for this second econometric model captures a larger 
geographical span of twenty-one railway markets but a smaller time frame of four years: 
2001, 2003, 2006 and 2010. The latest COM Index of the countries in this study is 
illustrated in Table A.2 of the Appendix. According to this 2011 chart, the United 
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Kingdom was the most competitive national railway network while sparsely-populated 
Finland and Lithuania ranked last. Another interesting fact of this index was the low 
ranks of large rail networks such as Spain and France – third and fourth to last, 
respectively. The detailed analysis of rail liberalization situations in different railway 
networks will be coupled in my case studies chapter.  
 
4. Regression results 
a. Vertical disintegration 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the first regression, which focuses on the vertical 
split’s impact on productivity. The dependent variable is the weighted sum of outputs in 
freight and passenger transport with λ chosen at 0.25, as explained in the previous 
section. The parameter estimates for labor and capital are both positive. Furthermore, the 
regression outcome indicates that a 25-percent increase in the number of employees 
doubles the aggregate output, while an 81-percent increase in track length leads to the 
same result. The positive sign of these parameter estimates is exactly in accordance with 
the model design based on the Cobb-Douglass function as well as the result by Friebel et 
al. (2010). However, the regression outcome in Friebel et al.’s study showed that 
doubling the aggregate output would require a 53-percent increase in labor or a 74-
percent increase in capital, ceteris paribus. As my dataset covers more recent years’ 
information than that of Friebel et al. (2010), the vast difference in the parameter estimate 
for labor might indicate technical advancement of rail transport, which leads to much 
28 
improvement in productivity in terms of labor input. The sum of β1 and β2 is slightly 
bigger than 1, which suggests small increasing economies of scale: increasing all inputs 
by the same percentage will lead to a proportionally larger increase in output. 
 
 
Table 1: Regression results: vertical split model 
More importantly, my regression results highlight a positive relationship between the 
policy implementation variable and aggregate output. On average, the vertical separation 
between infrastructure management and train service helps increase the network’s output 
by 0.56 percent. All t-values for the three parameter estimates are also statistically 
significant at a one-percent confidence level. Furthermore, the t-value of the parameter 
estimate for vertical split in this study is far more significant than that of Friebel et al.’s 
test, which failed to meet the 5% confidence level that rejected the null hypothesis that 
railway deregulation did not improve productivity. Small standard errors in the results 
also indicate the sample’s representativeness of the population, which can be explained 
by the large sample size and the comprehensiveness of data from the International Union 
                                                                              
       _cons     3.575818   .3174415    11.26   0.000     2.950981    4.200655
  separation     .5636402   .0656746     8.58   0.000     .4343694    .6929109
    lnlabour       .80738    .052531    15.37   0.000     .7039805    .9107796
   lncapital     .2501608   .0596072     4.20   0.000     .1328329    .3674888
                                                                              
      output        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    372.718909   287  1.29867216           Root MSE      =  .48868
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8161
    Residual    67.8211753   284  .238806955           R-squared     =  0.8180
       Model    304.897734     3  101.632578           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   284) =  425.58
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     288
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of Railways (UIC) and the World Bank. Thus, my regression results suggest that vertical 
separation between infrastructure management and train service has brought about greater 
network productivity in years following its implementation. 
Friebel et al. (2010) also underlined the data unavailability for the United Kingdom as an 
important factor that might affect their regression interpretation. In my study, the UK 
data from the International Union of Railways is partially inconsistent, especially in labor 
input, as many of the new rail franchises did not report their data annually. Missing 
values are estimated using data from the previous submission. Because of this 
shortcoming, I ran an alternative regression without the United Kingdom as suggested by 
Friebel et al. (2010). The regression results are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regression results: vertical split model (without United Kingdom data) 
Removing the United Kingdom data does not cause much change in the regression 
results. The new fitted model dictates that, under ceteris-paribus conditions, a 79-percent 
                                                                              
       _cons     3.883821   .3256507    11.93   0.000     3.242573     4.52507
  separation     .5376439   .0676925     7.94   0.000     .4043487    .6709392
     lnlabor     .7930444   .0535237    14.82   0.000     .6876494    .8984395
   lncapital     .2313242   .0597267     3.87   0.000     .1137145    .3489338
                                                                              
      output        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    330.277247   263  1.25580702           Root MSE      =  .48824
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8102
    Residual    61.9771018   260  .238373468           R-squared     =  0.8123
       Model    268.300145     3  89.4333817           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   260) =  375.18
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     264
. regress output lncapital lnlabor separation
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increase in the number of employees would lead to a doubling of output while a 23-
percent increase in track length would bring about the same result. Besides, excluding 
data from the United Kingdom (or reducing the sample size) makes the effects less 
significant, indicated by smaller t-values for all parameter estimates of the new model. 
Interestingly, in Friebel et al.’s 2010 test, the model that omitted the United Kingdom 
data actually resulted in a higher t-value for the parameter estimate of the deregulation 
variable. The opposite trend observed in this study might come from the fact that the 
UIC’s data for the United Kingdom are now available for all years covered in the analysis 
despite their inconsistency, while the dataset by Friebel et al. had to exclude the period 
when data were unobtainable. The difference in my study’s time frame might also lead to 
different regression outcomes. In addition, the sum of β1 and β2 in this model is reduced 
much closer to 1, which nearly suggests constant returns to scale: if all inputs are 
increased by the same percentage, output will increase by a proportionally equivalent 
amount. 
 
b. Competitiveness 
In my second econometric model, the dummy variable for vertical disintegration in the 
first regression is replaced by a variable for IBM and Kirchner’s COM Index, a measure 
of competitive dynamics levels across Europe. With a larger geographical coverage and 
different time span, this model is expected to provide an alternative view of rail transport 
productivity after market opening. Table 3 below illustrates the regression results.  
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Table 3: Regression results: competitiveness model 
The fitted model denotes that with other inputs remaining constant, a one-point increase 
in the level of railway market competitiveness leads to a 0.2-percent increase in aggregate 
output. The t-value for the COM variable’s parameter estimate is also significant at a 
one-percent confidence level. We thus can conclude that an increase in market 
competitiveness can help improve overall productivity. Both coefficients for capital and 
labor input have positive signs, which is in accordance with the results from the first 
study. However, capital is surprisingly not statistically significant at a five-percent 
confidence level in predicting overall output. The most likely reason for this is 
differences in rail technology across the present-day European Union where the 
relationship between track building and overall output can vary greatly between different 
rail networks. The limited time span of the COM Index also poses another shortcoming 
of this model, which might result in the insignificance of the capital variable.  
                                                                              
       _cons     1.252618   .9194929     1.36   0.177    -.5812524    3.086489
         com     .0020791   .0005115     4.06   0.000     .0010589    .0030993
     lnlabor     .9372098   .1695211     5.53   0.000     .5991106    1.275309
   lncapital     .2761368   .1826284     1.51   0.135     -.088104    .6403776
                                                                              
      output        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    189.968348    73  2.60230614           Root MSE      =  .83578
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7316
    Residual     48.896592    70  .698522743           R-squared     =  0.7426
       Model    141.071756     3  47.0239188           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,    70) =   67.32
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      74
. regress output lncapital lnlabor com
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Part V: Country Comparison 
1. Overview 
IBM Global Services, in conjunction with Christian Kirchner (2011), introduced the Rail 
Liberalization Index (LIB Index) to measure the relative degree of market opening of rail 
transport markets in the European Union, Switzerland and Norway. This index was a 
combination of two indices for market competition in theory and practice: the LEX Index 
and the ACCESS Index. Kirchner (2004) described the LEX Index as a measurement of 
the “law in books,” as it captured the degree of market entry support and external railway 
undertakings in the national competition regulation. On the other hand, the ACCESS 
Index indicated a “law in action” measurement that evaluated the reality of market 
accessibility and barriers to entry from potential external competitors’ point of view 
(IBM & Kirchner, 2011). The combined LIB Index put more weight on the reality of 
railway markets after liberalization, with the ACCESS Index accounting for 80 percent of 
the total measurement. This 2011 study placed Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Denmark and Austria at the top tier in its chart as markets with 
accessibility at the “Advanced” level. The majority of EU member states were in the 
second tier as networks with “On Schedule” market opening, while Lithuania, Greece, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Spain and Ireland fell behind at the lowest “Delayed” level. 
This same report also classified national railway networks in the EU into three categories 
based on the forms of vertical separation between the infrastructure manager and the 
service operator: separation, integration and hybrid. A separation model featured 
completely separate ownership of infrastructure management and network services, as 
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found in the national railway networks of Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. 
On the other hand, an integration model was characterized by a legal and functional 
separation of infrastructure and service levels but these two branches still existed under 
an umbrella corporation. As of 2011, this was the model of the railway networks in 
fourteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. Lastly, the 
hybrid model in France and the Czech Republic specified an independent infrastructure 
manager delegating its tasks back to the incumbent train service operator as part of an 
agency agreement. To address the concern of whether the network’s operation model 
affects its accessibility, IBM and Kirchner’s 2011 study also showed no correlation 
between the model types and the degree of market opening. 
 
2. The United Kingdom and the franchising system 
Ranking first in 2007 and second in 2011 (behind Sweden) in IBM and Kirchner’s Rail 
Liberalization Index report (2011), the United Kingdom has one of the most liberalized 
rail transport markets in the European Union. The British railway network is a foremost 
example of the separation model that involves a complete vertical split between 
infrastructure managers and service operators. The Railways Act 1993, the first 
regulatory implementation of railway liberalization, imposed structural reforms focusing 
on the transfer of railway companies’ ownership to the private sector, as well as a 
fundamental separation between infrastructure management and train operations. 
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Following the Act, a new government-owned infrastructure manager, Railtrack, was 
formed in 1994 as a completely separated entity from British Rail, the dominant 
incumbent at the time (Kain, 1998). In May 1996, the liberalization process took a further 
step as Railtrack became publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange. On the other 
hand, the remainder of British Rail was completely split into privatized companies with 
different concentrations in operations, including (Kain, 1998): 
• Seven in infrastructure maintenance 
• Seven in infrastructure services design 
• Six in track renewal 
• Three in rolling stock leasing (ROSCOs) 
• Six in freight transport operations 
• Twenty-five in franchised passenger transport operations 
With a very large number of newly formed entities from the previous dominant British 
Rail, the railway liberalization process in the United Kingdom achieved not only a 
complete vertical separation but also a thorough horizontal split. 
A notable characteristic of the British rail transport liberalization is its franchising 
system. The fundamental railroad reform in 1993 helped establish twenty-five privately 
owned passenger train operations units that went under a franchising process 
administered by the Director of Rail Franchising, which was also formed following the 
Railways Act. Currently, the process is carried out by the Department of Transport, 
which invites potential bidders to tender for a specific route as the previous franchising 
contract is expiring. The governing authority then takes into account numerous criteria 
such as service frequency, infrastructure payment and the level of public subsidy the 
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bidder needs. The standard length of a rail franchise is seven years; however, franchise 
holders that make additional investments in special routes have the option for longer 
contracts. It should also be noted that rolling stocks, such as locomotives, train cars and 
wagons, are not owned by franchised service operators. The liberalization process has 
established a separate group of companies, the ROSCOs, which provide the franchise 
holders with the rolling stocks through independent leasing contracts. Overall, the British 
regulators’ attempt to liberalize the rail transport market could be seen as very thorough 
and systematic: the reforms help boost newcomers’ fair access to all of the network’s 
primary resources including rail tracks, rolling stocks and government subsidies. A 
detailed map of the relationships between the newly formed entities after their split from 
British Rail was highlighted in Kain’s 1998 report: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Relationships between rail transport entities in the UK (Kain, 1998) 
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The British franchising system has been proved successful with significant increases in 
passenger volume and service frequency of 70.1% and 36.7% respectively (European 
Commission, 2010). Politt and Smith (2001) also pointed out that privatization helped 
lower both prices and public subsidies. However, since the Railways Act’s 
implementation in 1994, its complexity and unclear accountabilities have been widely 
criticized (BBC, 2006). First of all, the governing authority of the franchising process 
seemed to place a strong emphasis on the financial aspect of the bids. For a franchise that 
required a public subsidy, lowest-bid winners had to comply with stricter standard 
requirements, which were generally close to the levels of the British Rail service before 
privatization. On the other hand, operators of profitable routes, who paid infrastructure 
fees instead of receiving government subsidies, were likely to gain more freedom in their 
operations (Preston, Whelan, Nash & Wardman, 2000). This has led to critical questions 
on the franchises’ safety standards. Furthermore, severe railway accidents following 
British Rail’s vertical and horizontal split also casted a doubt on the maintenance and 
renewal process of Railtrack, the private-sector infrastructure manager, and the short-
term investment tendency of franchise holders was also blamed for devaluing the system 
maintenance and durability (European Commission, 2010). As a response to this, in 2001 
the Strategic Rail Authority was formed to improve the administration of the franchising 
process while stricter maintenance requirements were introduced to raise the network’s 
standards. Moreover, the highly-criticized for-profit infrastructure manager Railtrack was 
succeeded in 2002 by Network Rail, which has operated as a non-profit entity. 
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3. Germany: open access and public service obligations 
IBM and Kirchner’s 2011 European Rail Liberalization Index report ranked Germany as 
the third most advanced railway market in the rail transport liberalization process, behind 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. With the infrastructure manager and service operator 
functioning independently under an umbrella corporation, the national railway network in 
Germany is a notable example of the integrated model in IBM and Kirchner’s 2011 
study. Before the rail liberalization policy took place, Deutsche Bahn AG was the sole 
provider of both national and regional services in Germany (European Commission, 
2010). Following the implementation of the EU Council Directive 91/440, the passenger 
traffic division DB Bahn, the logistics unit DB Schenker and the infrastructure 
management subsidiary DB Netze were established in 2007 as separate organizational 
entities at the accounting level. The detailed functional relationships between different 
railway entities in Germany are demonstrated in Figure 5 (Link, 1994). 
The further privatization process of the state-owned Deutsche Bahn has been under 
heated debate: the Merkel government approved a plan in 2007 that aimed at splitting 
Deutsche Bahn gradually while granting it the control over the track network for the 
following 15 years. This plan was met with uneasy response from the sixteen states’ 
transportation ministers, as they feared Deutsche Bahn’s overpowering track management 
could hamper competition, which would lead to lower service frequency in remote areas 
(Lindsey, 2007). A 2007 report by Slack and Volt also signified Deutsche Bahn’s 
dominance in both infrastructure and the traffic services in the future despite legislative 
measures (Slack & Volt, 2007). 
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Figure 5: Relationships between railway entities in Germany (Link, 1994) 
The German railroad liberalization process could also be characterized by the concurrent 
existence of two operational options: open access and public service contract. The 
European Commission’s 2010 report recognized the common practice of public service 
obligations (PSOs) in the regional passenger market where external competitors had 
emerged by 2010 and DB Regio’s dominance had been consistently reduced. In 2006, 
external operators achieved a 15.2 percent share of the regional passenger rail network, 
which translated to a 10.1 percent share of the overall system (Beria, Quinet, de Ruz & 
Schulz, 2010). Passenger transport in short distance is not profitable for the most part and 
thus requires public subsidies. The competitive tendering process in Germany is carried 
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out similarly to the United Kingdom’s franchising with the bidder for the lowest public 
subsidies winning the contract. The European Commission’s 2010 study highlighted the 
success of Germany’s PSOs as the regional passenger transport market achieved 
significant gains in ridership, service frequency and network extension. However, this 
report also underlined larger costs for local governments in providing public subsidies as 
competitive tendering became widely practiced in all regional networks, including very 
remote ones. Overall, public service obligations could be seen as socially beneficial but 
also financially burdensome.  
On the other hand, Germany’s interregional passenger network is characterized by the 
open access practice. The market is open to any competitor interested in operating for-
profit in long distance routes. However, the European Commission pointed out the 
regulatory uncertainty and the very powerful position of the incumbent, Deutsche Bahn 
as reasons for the lack of market entry (2010). In 2006, external operators contributed to 
less than one percent of the market share in long distance passenger traffic (Beria et al., 
2010). However, Germany’s railway liberalization process could still be considered 
partially successful as the vertical disintegration at the accounting level led to a surplus in 
Deutsche Bahn’s budget, which had never occurred before this policy implementation. 
The introduction of the United Kingdom’s competitive franchising, which was already 
employed in Germany’s bus industry, was also unlikely: franchising would require a 
complete separation between infrastructure management and service operations as well as 
a breakup of the incumbent monopoly (Lalive & Schmutzler, 2008). 
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4. France and the hybrid model 
The railway network in France exemplifies IBM and Kirchner’s hybrid model of 
liberalization (2011): the independent Reseau Ferré de France (RFF) controls the 
infrastructure management level, but still transfers major track management tasks to the 
national rail transport provider SNCF through special contracts. This indicates an unclear 
vertical separation between infrastructure management and service operations. 
Furthermore, the French government owns both RFF and SNCF and acts as the decisive 
supervisor of SNCF to stabilize its financial flow and plan research and development 
projects. On the other hand, national infrastructure manager RFF, though owned by the 
government, operates independently (Szekely, 2009). 
In IBM’s 2011 Rail Liberalization Index report, France moved up from the “delayed” 
level in 2007 to the “on schedule” group in 2011. This highlighted the progress of railway 
liberalization in France, even though its market was still far less open than those of the 
United Kingdom and Germany. Following EU Directive 91/440, the RFF was split from 
SNCF in 1997 to become an independent infrastructure manager. However, after thirteen 
years of the supposed liberalization process, SNCF was still the sole provider of rail 
transport and operated under public service obligations both regionally and nationally. By 
2006, a few service providers had licensed their operations but still remained inactive 
thereafter (Beria et al. 2010). Sakamoto (2012) underlined that the RFF formation was 
simply to obey EU regulations, while RFF and SNCF were almost integrated in reality: in 
2004, RFF paid SNCF 2.6 billion euros for its infrastructure maintenance in exchange for 
2.3 billion euros in infrastructure access fee from SNCF. 
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Moreover, Quinet (2006) labeled France as “one of the most reluctant countries to 
provide open access” and pointed out that the operation of the French railway network 
following liberalization had been rather unsuccessful and was under increasing pressure 
for productivity improvement. In this report, SNCF’s debt rose seventeen percent from 35 
billion euros in 1991 to 41 billion in 2005, even though it had transferred more than half 
of its debt (20.5 million euro) to RFF through the modal split in 1996. Quinet (2006) also 
noted SNCF’s loss in eighty percent of its cargo services in 2004. 
Regarding the low level of market opening in France’s rail transport, researchers have 
raised multiple questions about public opinions on railway liberalization. Tomeš’s 2008 
study underlined the French government’s reluctance to liberalize the market as French 
politicians were skeptical about the benefits from greater competition and also questioned 
market opening’s suitability to the incumbent network. Moreover, Rogers (2007) 
highlighted France’s prevalent preference of minimizing competition to endorse social 
equality and cohesion as another barrier hindering the liberalization of rail transport, 
which was widely regarded as a non-profit public service. Therefore, with the skepticism 
of both the government and the general public about promoting competition, it is unlikely 
that significant progress in the liberalization of the French railway network will arise in 
the near future. 
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Part VI: Concluding Remarks 
Rail transport liberalization has taken place in the European Union in the last twenty 
years. The core of the reforms was a vertical disintegration between track management 
and train service operations, which was initiated in Directive 91/440. Thereafter, the 
legislative mechanisms were further developed to enhance market entry, interoperability, 
competitiveness and service quality. In 1995, the European Commission adopted two key 
regulations to enable universal licensing procedures for train operators and guarantee 
non-discriminatory infrastructure allocation and capacity charging for new railway 
undertakings. The 2001 First Railway Package defined clearer relationships between 
infrastructure management and service operations and enhanced fair access by requiring 
an independent entity to set and collect infrastructure usage fees. The 2004 Second 
Railway Package focused on upgrading interoperability for international train services 
and established the European Railway Agency to harmonize safety principles between 
national networks. Interoperability was further enhanced in the 2007 Third Railway 
Package, which allowed free access to international passenger transport market, ensured 
passengers’ rights across Europe and enabled common licensing for train drivers. 
My theoretical framework analyzed how opening up monopolistic rail transport markets 
can eliminate the deadweight loss to society. Using a Bertrand analysis, my study 
furthermore specifies a fare reduction to the perfectly competitive level in rail transport 
markets after liberalization. Two game theoretical models also highlight how opening up 
rail transport markets leads to diversifying service schedules and lowering prices.  
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My econometric tests employ the production frontier model by Friebel et al. (2010). The 
regression results justify the effects of vertical split and market opening on network 
productivity, both of which are significant at a one-percent confidence level. Therefore, 
rail transport liberalization is a worthy process that European rail networks can benefit 
from in multiple aspects. Indeed, railway liberalization should be developed and carried 
out more thoroughly across the European Union, especially as the trans-European rail 
network becomes more integrated. 
In practice, the modal split between infrastructure management and service operations 
exists in three main methods: complete separation (United Kingdom), functional and 
legal separation an umbrella company (Germany) and a hybrid model that involves 
special agreements between track management and operations (France). The result of 
market opening also varies widely between member states. The United Kingdom utilizes 
a franchising process and has liberalized its network to a great extent. In the United 
Kingdom and Sweden, the two most deregulated rail networks, passenger volume has 
increased, while fares and public subsidies have dropped since liberalization (European 
Commission, 2010; Pollitt & Smith, 2001; Alexandersson & Hultén, 2008). Germany has 
also achieved an advanced level in railway reforms, even though the incumbent’s 
dominance has nevertheless remained prevalent. Meanwhile, given the government’s 
stubborn ownership of the railway network and a social reluctance to open up the market, 
France still has a long way to go in its rail liberalization process. 
A major concern arises over my study’s sole focus on production output as a determinant 
of liberalization success. Are customers of the extensively privatized British rail network 
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more satisfied than those of the vertically integrated French network? Rising questions on 
the British network’s safety standards reflect public discontent with rail liberalization to 
some extent. Meanwhile, both France’s government and general public consider rail 
transport as a non-profit public service and are not willing to implement liberalization 
reforms. However, a 2011 report by the European Commission pointed out that British 
train riders were significantly more satisfied with their country’s network than French 
ones in multiple aspects. Eighty-four percent of passengers in the United Kingdom were 
“very or rather satisfied” with the frequency of trains, while 73 percent of passengers in 
France had the same response. Moreover, 87 percent of British train riders were pleased 
by the network’s punctuality and reliability, while only 55 percent of French customers 
felt the same. The United Kingdom also ranked higher than France in traveling speed, 
information provision and connections. Notably, the UK ranked relatively low in rail 
cars’ cleanliness and maintenance, which reflected the public concern mentioned in the 
case studies section. Thus, in short, this European Commission study (2011) suggested 
that passengers of the more liberalized British rail network were generally more satisfied 
with its services than those in France. However, given no data availability of customer 
satisfaction over the period prior and after liberalization, more studies need to be 
developed to capture the relationship between market opening and public opinion. 
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Appendix 
Criteria 
% in overall 
index 
% in 
category 
Modal split changes 20   
Change in the modal split for rail freight transport (2001 - 
2008) 
 40 
Change in the modal split for rail passenger transport (2001 - 
2008) 
 40 
Share of modal split for rail freight transport 2008  10 
Share of modal split for rail passenger transport 2008  10 
Number of external RUs 2009 20   
Certified RUs (excl. incumbent) in relation to network length  40 
Ratio of active RUs to certified RUs  50 
Number of active RUs providing passenger services on a 
regular basis 
 10 
Market share external RUs 2009 60   
Market share ext. RUs in terms of transport performance  75 
Increase in market share of ext. RUs between 2006 and 2009   25 
 
Table A.1. The makeup of the 2011 COM Index (IBM & Kirchner, 2011) 
 
Country Year of vertical split 
Austria 1997 
Belgium 1998 
Denmark 1997 
Finland 1995 
France 1997 
Germany 1994 
Italy 1998 
The Netherlands 1995 
Portugal 1997 
Spain 1996 
Sweden 1988 
United Kingdom 1993 
 
Table A.2. Time of vertical separation (Friebel et al., 2010) 
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Table A.3. IBM’s 2011 COM Index (Kirchner, 2011) 
  
Country 2011 COM Index 
United Kingdom 866 
Netherlands 680 
Denmark 655 
Estonia 629 
Germany 615 
Sweden 577 
Austria 575 
Hungary  522 
Poland 518 
Italy 470 
Portugal  434 
Belgium 424 
Czech Republic 422 
Bulgaria 421 
Latvia 411 
Slovakia 381 
Slovenia  337 
France 334 
Spain 333 
Finland 156 
Lithuania 120 
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